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SEPARABILITY BY SEMIVALUES MODIFIED
FOR GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURE ∗
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Abstract. Two games are inseparable by semivalues if both games
obtain the same allocation whatever semivalue is considered. The prob-
lem of separability by semivalues reduces to separability from the null
game. For four or more players, the vector subspace of games insep-
arable from the null game by semivalues contains games diﬀerent to
zero-game. Now, for ﬁve or more players, the consideration of a priori
coalition blocks in the player set allows us to reduce in a signiﬁcant
way the dimension of the vector subspace of games inseparable from
the null game. For these subspaces we provide basis formed by games
of a particular type.
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1. Introduction
Probabilistic values as solution concepts for cooperative games were introduced
by Weber [11] in 1988. A probabilistic value assigns to each player a weighted sum
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of its marginal contributions to the coalitions, where the weighting coeﬃcients
form a probability distribution over the coalitions to which it belongs.
A particular type of probabilistic value is formed by the semivalues that were
deﬁned by Dubey, et al. [5] in 1981. In this case the weighting coeﬃcients are
independent of the players and they only depend on the coalition size. Semivalues
represent a natural generalization of both the Shapley value [10] and the Banzhaf
value [3,7].
It is possible to ﬁnd two cooperative games that obtain the same payoﬀ vector
by each semivalue. We say that these games are inseparable by semivalues. By
the linearity property of semivalues, we can reduce the problem of separability
between games to separability from the null game. The vector subspace of games
inseparable from the null game by semivalues is called shared kernel [1] and its
dimension is 2n − n2 + n− 2, where n denotes the number of players. For spaces
of cooperative games with four or more players, the shared kernel contains games
diﬀerent to the zero game
The probabilistic values are a wide family of solutions: given two diﬀerent
games, it is always possible to ﬁnd a probabilistic value that separates them.
The semivalues also form an important family of solutions. We can evaluate its
largeness according to its ability to separate games. Two games are separable
if their diﬀerence does not belong to the shared kernel. The dimension of this
subspace would measure the impossibility of separation.
In this paper we consider a priori coalition blocks in the player set. Each
coalition block is a group of players which decide to act together with respect to
the rest of the players. The coalition blocks can be economic, political or social
agents with aﬃnities or common interests. The coalition blocks act as one unit
in a ﬁrst bargaining process. Later, a new bargaining process occurs among the
members of each block. Thus, the existence of coalition blocks implies two levels
of interaction among the players: ﬁrst, among the coalition blocks, and second,
within each coalition block.
A semivalue modiﬁed for games with coalition structure [2] applies the con-
sidered semivalue in both levels of interaction – indeed, as we will see later, the
induced semivalues corresponding to both levels. – Our purpose is to reduce the
dimension of the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game. For
cooperative games with ﬁve or more players, the semivalues modiﬁed for games
with coalition structure manage to reduce in a signiﬁcant way the dimension of
the shared kernel.
In addition, once an a priori ordering is chosen in the player set, the shared
kernel is spanned by speciﬁc {−1, 0, 1}-valued games so-called shuﬄe games [1].
Now, we will prove that the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null
game by modiﬁed semivalues is spanned by games introduced here under the name
of expanded shuﬄe games.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider the solution con-
cepts of semivalue and semivalue modiﬁed for games with coalition structure. Also,
nomenclature and main results for games inseparable by semivalues are described.
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Section 3 shows that shuﬄe games which are solutions to the problem of separa-
bility by semivalues do not have, in general, the same property with respect to
separability by modiﬁed semivalues. In Section 4 two suﬃcient conditions for sep-
arability by modiﬁed semivalues are proposed. Finally, in Section 5 we determine
the dimension and a basis for each vector subspace of games inseparable from the
null game by modiﬁed semivalues.
2. Preliminaries
Cooperative games and semivalues
A cooperative game with transferable utility or TU game is a pair (N, v), where N
is a ﬁnite set of players, usually N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and v : 2N → R is the so-called
characteristic function, which assigns to every coalition S ⊆ N a real number v(S),
the worth of coalition S, and satisﬁes the natural condition v(∅) = 0. We denote
the set of all cooperative TU games on N by GN . For a given set of players N ,
we identify each game (N, v) with its characteristic function v.
A solution or a value on GN is a function Ψ : GN → RN which assigns to
every game v a vector Ψ[v] with components Ψi[v] for all i ∈ N and it represents
a method to measure the negotiation strength of the players in the game. The
vector space RN is called the allocation space. Semivalues as solution concepts
were introduced and axiomatically characterized by Dubey et al. [5]. Given a game
v ∈ GN and a semivalue ψ on GN , the allocation to each player is an average of
the marginal contributions to the coalitions to which it belongs,
ψi[v] =
∑
S⊆N :i∈S
pns [v(S)− v(S\{i})] ∀i ∈ N, (2.1)
where s = |S| and n = |N |. The weighting coeﬃcients pns only depend on the
coalition size and verify
∑n
s=1
(
n−1
s−1
)
pns = 1 and p
n
s ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ s ≤ n. We denote
the set of all semivalues on GN by Sem(GN ).
Let α ∈ (0, 1). We call binomial semivalue ψα to the semivalue whose coeﬃ-
cients are pnα,s=αs−1(1−α)n−s for s = 1, . . . , n. Using the convention that 00 = 1,
the deﬁnition makes sense also for α = 0 and α = 1. We respectively get the dicta-
torial index for α = 0 and the marginal index for α = 1: (ψ0)i[v] = v({i}) ∀i ∈ N
and (ψ1)i[v] = v(N)− v(N \ {i}) ∀i ∈ N . The Banzhaf value [3,7] is the binomial
semivalue for α = 1/2.
It is proven [2] that n distinct binomial semivalues form a reference system in
Sem(GN ): given n distinct numbers αj in [0, 1], for each semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(GN )
there exists a unique family of coeﬃcients λj , 1 ≤j ≤n, such that ψ=
∑n
j=1 λjψαj .
The multilinear extension [6] (MLE in the sequel) of a game v ∈ GN is the
function fv : [0, 1]n → R deﬁned by
fv(x1, x2, ..., xn) =
∑
S⊆N
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
j /∈S
(1− xj)v(S). (2.2)
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As it happens for the Banzhaf value, the allocation by each binomial semivalue
can be computed by replacing in the partial derivatives of the MLE the variables
by the value α [2]:
(ψα)i[v] =
∂fv
∂xi
(α) ∀i ∈ N, where α = (α, α, . . . , α).
In addition, the allocation for any semivalue can be computed by means of a
product of two matrices:
ψ[v] = B Λ, (2.3)
where the matrix B depends on each reference system of semivalues B =
( bij )1≤i,j≤n with bij = (ψαj )i[v] =
∂fv
∂xi
(αj) and Λ is the column matrix of the
coeﬃcients of ψ in this reference system, Λt = (λ1 λ2 · · ·λn) if ψ =
∑n
j=1 λjψαj .
This way, a (n×n)-matrix summarizes the payments by any semivalue to all players
of a given game v.
Modified semivalues
Given a semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(GN ) with weighting coeﬃcients pns , the recursively
obtained numbers
pms = p
m+1
s + p
m+1
s+1 1 ≤ s ≤ m < n,
deﬁne an induced semivalue ψm on the space of cooperative games with m play-
ers (see, for instance, [4]). Adding the initial semivalue, the family of induced
semivalues {ψm ∈ Sem(GM ) / 1 ≤ m ≤ n} allowed to deﬁne the concept of semi-
value modiﬁed for games with coalition structure [2] following a similar process to
that used by Owen to derive the coalition value [8] from the Shapley value or the
modiﬁed Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure [9] from the Banzhaf
value.
We denote a coalition structure in N by B = {B1, B2, ..., Bm}, i.e., a ﬁnite
partition of N , ∪mk=1Bk = N and Bk ∩Bl = ∅ for k = l. Now, M = {1, . . . ,m} is
the set of classes in N given by the coalition structure B. For each K ⊆ Bj , we
deﬁne a modiﬁed quotient game
uBj |K(L) = v
( ⋃
l∈L
Bl \K ′
) ∀L ⊆ M,
where K ′ = Bj \ K. This is the game played by the partition classes with the
exception of Bj , that is replaced by the subset K. Since the game uBj |K is deﬁned
on a set M with m players (1 ≤ m ≤ n), we can apply the induced semivalue ψm:
wj(K) = (ψm)j [uBj |K ] ∀K ⊆ Bj .
The value wj(K) denotes the strategic position of the subset K ⊆ Bj if this subset
directly negotiates with the other classes as players in the quotient game, according
to the semivalue ψ, in absence of K ′ = Bj \K.
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Next, since the game wj is deﬁned on Bj , a set with bj = |Bj | players (1 ≤
bj ≤ n), we can apply the induced semivalue ψbj and we deﬁne the semivalue ψ
modiﬁed by the coalition structure B as
ψi[v;B] = (ψbj )i[wj ] ∀i ∈ Bj .
The semivalue ψ has acted twice: among the coalition blocks and within the coali-
tion block to which the player i belongs. An explicit expression for the allocations
according to modiﬁed semivalues is derived in [2]:
ψi[v;B] =
∑
S⊆Bj\{i}
∑
T⊆M\{j}
p
bj
s+1 p
m
t+1
[
v
(⋃
t∈T
Bt ∪ S ∪ {i}
)
− v
(⋃
t∈T
Bt ∪ S
)]
.
(2.4)
For the coalition structures with individual blocks, Bi = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}}, and
grand coalition, Bt = {{1, 2, . . . , n}}, the modiﬁed allocations agree with the allo-
cation by the initial semivalue.
Also, the allocations by modiﬁed semivalues can be computed by means of
a product of matrices, once a reference system of binomial semivalues has been
chosen:
ψi[v;B] = Λt A(i) Λ. (2.5)
Matrix Λ is like in expression (2.3). The elements apq(i), 1 ≤ p, q ≤ n, of the
matrix A(i) can be obtained from the MLE fv = fv(x1, x2, ..., xn) of a game v by
means of the following rules:
(i) For each t ∈ M, t = j, and each m ∈ Bt replace the variable xm by yt.
Thus, a new function of the variables xk, yt for k ∈ Bj and t ∈ M \ {j} is
obtained.
(ii) In the above function, reduce all exponents that appear in yt to 1, that is,
replace yrt (r > 1) by yt, obtaining another multilinear function gj(xk, yt),
k ∈ Bj and t ∈M \ {j}.
(iii) Calculate the partial derivative of gj with respect to the variable xi.
(iv) Replace each xk with αp and each yt with αq. Then,
apq(i) =
∂gj
∂xi
(αp, αq) for 1 ≤ p, q ≤ n. (2.6)
The function gj is a multilinear function related with the game v and the coalition
block Bj . It is valid for all players in the coalition block Bj .
One can ﬁnd a detailed proof and several examples of this procedure to compute
allocations by modiﬁed semivalues in [2].
Separability by semivalues
We say that two games v, v′ ∈ GN such that v = v′ are separable by a solution Ψ on
GN if Ψ[v] = Ψ[v′]. Since semivalues verify linearity, we only consider separability
from the null game.
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For each GN , the linear subspace of games inseparable by semivalues from the
null game is called shared kernel CN . It is proven [1] that games v ∈ CN verify∑
S:i∈S, |S|=s
v(S) = 0 for all i ∈ N and 1 ≤ s ≤ n. (2.7)
Grouping these conditions according to coalition sizes, the freedom degrees for
each s with 2 ≤ s ≤ n−2 are (ns)− n, whereas v(S) = 0 for |S| = 1, n−1, n. This
way, the dimension of CN is 2n − n2 + n − 2 for |N | = n ≥ 2 and CN = {0} if
|N | = 2, 3.
In game spaces GN with cardinality |N | ≥ 4, for a given coalition S ⊆ N and
players i, j ∈ S and k, l ∈ N \ S, we deﬁne the shuﬄe game vS,i,j,k,l as
vS,i,j,k,l = 1S + 1S∪{k,l}\{i,j} − 1S∪{k}\{i} − 1S∪{l}\{j}, (2.8)
where 1S is the unity game in GN (1S(S) = 1 and 1S(T ) = 0 otherwise). If
v ∈ GN is a shuﬄe game, then v ∈ CN . In [1], it is proven that the shared
kernel is spanned by shuﬄe games. Since each shuﬄe game takes non null values
uniquely on coalitions of a single size, the number of selected games in the proof
of this property is
(
n
s
)− n for coalitions S with 2 ≤ s ≤ n− 2 (|S| = s).
3. Shuffle games and coalition structures
Proposition 3.1. Let fv = fv(x1, x2, ..., xn) be the MLE of a game v ∈ GN .
v ∈ CN ⇔ ∇fv(α) = 0 ∀α ∈ [0, 1], α = (α, α, . . . , α).
Proof. If v ∈ CN , then ψ[v] = 0 ∀ψ ∈ Sem(GN ). In particular, for every binomial
semivalue ψα with α ∈ [0, 1], ψα[v] = ∇fv(α) = 0 where α = (α, . . . , α).
Conversely, since n binomial semivalues form a reference system in Sem(GN ),
every semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(GN ) can uniquely be written like ψ =
∑n
j=1 λjψαj with
αj ∈ [0, 1] for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Then,
ψ[v] =
n∑
j=1
λjψαj [v] =
n∑
j=1
λj∇fv(αj) = 0
and the game v belongs to the shared kernel CN . 
Example 3.2. Let N = {i, j, k, l} be the set of players. For cooperative games
with four players the coalition S in the shuﬄe games is only composed by two
players. For short, when S = {i, j} we write the shuﬄe game vS,i,j,k,l as vi,j,k,l,
i.e.,
vi,j,k,l = 1{i,j} + 1{k,l} − 1{j,k} − 1{i,l}.
The MLE of this game is fvi,j,k,l = xixj + xkxl − xjxk − xixl.
It is easy to see that ∇fvi,j,k,l(α) = 0 ∀α ∈ [0, 1], as one expects for a game
inseparable from the null game by semivalues.
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Definition 3.3. We say that a cooperative game v ∈ GN is inseparable from the
null game by semivalues modiﬁed for games with coalition structure if and only if
ψ[v;B] = 0 for every semivalue ψ on GN and every coalition structure B in N .
The above deﬁnition introduces our central concept of separability between
games by modiﬁed semivalues. According to the linearity property, the concept
reduces to separability from the null game. Now, shuﬄe games that give the
solution to the problem of separability by semivalues, oﬀer a diﬀerent answer
according to the cardinality of the player set.
Proposition 3.4. Let GN be the vector space of cooperative TU games with four
players, |N | = 4. A game v ∈ GN is inseparable from the null game by semivalues
if and only if it is inseparable from the null game by semivalues modiﬁed for games
with coalition structure.
Proof. For case |N | = 4, the shared kernel CN has dimension 2. According to
the development in [1], a basis for CN is formed by the shuﬄe games v1,4,3,2 and
v2,4,3,1. For the shuﬄe games in a basis of CN , we will prove that the condition
of inseparability from the null game by semivalues extends to the condition of
inseparability from the null game by modiﬁed semivalues. For the remaining games
in CN , the property is veriﬁed by linearity.
We consider, for example, game v2,4,3,1 and simultaneously all possible types
of coalition structures in N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. (a) Four individual blocks. (b) One
bipersonal block where game v2,4,3,1 takes non-null value and two individual blocks.
(c) Like in (b) but taking null value. (d) Two bipersonal blocks where game v2,4,3,1
takes non-null values. (e) Like in (d) but taking null values. (f) One coalition block
with three players. (g) Only one coalition block with four players.
In cases (a) and (g), both allocations coincide: ψ[v2,4,3,1;B] = ψ[v2,4,3,1] = 0
∀ψ ∈ Sem(GN ), B = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}} or B = {{1, 2, 3, 4}}.
From now on we will use the MLE fv2,4,3,1 = x2x4 + x1x3 − x3x4 − x1x2.
Case (b). We consider, for instance, the coalition structure B={{1, 2},{3}, {4}}.
According to the rules that lead to the terms in expression (2.6) for obtaining the
value ψ1[v2,4,3,1;B] by means of a product of matrices as in (2.5), we ﬁrst determine
the modiﬁed MLE g1:
g1(x1, x2, y2, y3) = x2y3 + x1y2 − y2y3 − x1x2;
∂g1
∂x1
= y2 − x2 ⇒ apq(1) = ∂g1
∂x1
(αp, αq) = αq − αp for 1 ≤ p, q ≤ 4.
Written any semivalue ψ as a linear combination of four diﬀerent binomial semi-
values, we can conclude that
ψ1[v2,4,3,1;B] = Λt A(1) Λ = 0 ∀ψ ∈ Sem(GN ),
since, in this case, matrix A(1) satisﬁes apq(1) = −aqp(1) for 1 ≤ p, q ≤ 4. In a
similar way, ψ2[v2,4,3,1;B] = 0 ∀ψ ∈ Sem(GN ).
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Now, for obtaining the value ψ3[v2,4,3,1;B], we determine the modiﬁed MLE g2:
g2(y1, x3, y3) = y1y3 + y1x3 − x3y3 − y1;
∂g2
∂x3
= y1 − y3 ⇒ apq(3) = ∂g2
∂x3
(αp, αq) = 0 for 1 ≤ p, q ≤ 4.
Then ψ3[v2,4,3,1;B] = 0 and, also, ψ4[v2,4,3,1;B] = 0.
Case (c). Possible coalition structure B = {{1, 4}, {2}, {3}}.
g1(x1, x4, y2, y3) = y2x4 + x1y3 − y3x4 − x1y2;
∂g1
∂x1
= y3 − y2 ⇒ apq(1) = ∂g1
∂x1
(αp, αq) = 0 for 1 ≤ p, q ≤ 4.
Consequently, ψ1[v2,4,3,1;B] = 0. In a similar way, ψ4[v2,4,3,1;B] = 0 and
ψ2[v2,4,3,1;B] = ψ3[v2,4,3,1;B] = 0.
Similar manipulations of the MLE fv2,4,3,1 in cases (d), (e) and (f) give rise to
the same conclusion: ψ[v2,4,3,1;B] = 0.
Conversely, if a game is inseparable from the null game by modiﬁed semivalues,
in particular, it is inseparable from the null game by semivalues. It suﬃces to
consider the coalition structure formed by individual blocks. 
Proposition 3.5. Let GN a vector space of cooperative TU games with ﬁve or
more players. Every shuﬄe game in GN is separable from the null game by semi-
values modiﬁed for games with coalition structure.
Proof. In GN with |N | ≥ 5, the shuﬄe game vS,i,j,k,l = 1S + 1S∪{k,l}\{i,j} −
1S∪{k}\{i} − 1S∪{l}\{j} , with i, j ∈ S and k, l ∈ N \ S, has by MLE
fvS,i,j,k,l = [xixj + xkxl − xjxk − xixl]
∏
p∈S\{i,j}
xp
∏
q∈N\(S∪{k,l})
(1− xq).
For coalitions S with 2 ≤ |S| < n−2, we consider the coalition structure BS =
{S,N \ S}. The modiﬁed MLE g1 for players in block S is
g1 = xixj(1− y2)
∏
p∈S\{i,j}
xp and
∂g1
∂xi
= xj(1− y2)
∏
p∈S\{i,j}
xp ,
where N \ (S ∪ {k, l}) = ∅ since |S| < n−2.
Then, the modiﬁed Banzhaf value β separates the game vS,i,j,k,l, 2 ≤ |S| < n−2,
from the null game:
βi[vS,i,j,k,l;BS ] =
∂g1
∂xi
(1/2, 1/2) =
1
2s
= 0.
For case |S| = n−2, S = N \ {k, l} and the MLE is
fvN\{k,l},i,j,k,l = [xixj + xkxl − xjxk − xixl]
∏
p∈N\{i,j,k,l}
xp.
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Now, we consider the coalition structure BN\{k,l} = {N \ {k, l}, {k, l}} and we
obtain the modiﬁed MLE g1 for players in block N \ {k, l}:
g1 = [xixj + y2 − xjy2 − xiy2]
∏
p∈N\{i,j,k,l}
xp,
where N \ {i, j, k, l} = ∅ since |N | ≥ 5. Let h be a player in N \ {i, j, k, l}. Again,
the modiﬁed Banzhaf value β separates the game vN\{k,l},i,j,k,l from the null game:
∂g1
∂xh
= [xixj + y2 − xjy2 − xiy2]
∏
p∈N\{h,i,j,k,l}
xp
and
βh[vN\{k,l},i,j,k,l;BN\{k,l}] =
∂g1
∂xh
(1/2, 1/2) =
1
2n−3
= 0. 
4. Sufficient conditions of separability
In the previous section we have seen that, for games with ﬁve or more players,
the shuﬄe games do not solve the problem of inseparability by semivalues mod-
iﬁed for games with coalition structure. In this section we provide two suﬃcient
conditions of separability, that is, two necessary conditions of inseparability from
the null game by modiﬁed semivalues.
The inseparability from the null game by semivalues demands a certain con-
dition of complementarity for the coalitions of extreme sizes: v(N) = v(∅) = 0
and v(N \ {i}) = v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N (see (2.7) and subsequent comment).
Proposition 4.1 will show that this condition of complementarity must extend to all
coalitions S and N \S in order to assure the inseparability by modiﬁed semivalues.
Later, once the ﬁrst necessary condition is assumed (v(S) = v(N \S) ∀S ⊆ N),
Proposition 4.2 will introduce a more elaborated requirement: the utility of each
coalition must reduce to the utility of all contained bipersonal coalitions. The
bipersonal coalitions are the most elementary coalition blocks, since in our context,
the unipersonal coalitions obtain null utility. A game with a coalition whose utility
is not the sum of utilities of its contained bipersonal coalitions can be separated
from the null game by a certain coalition structure and a certain semivalue.
Proposition 4.1. Let GN be a vector space of cooperative TU games with four or
more players, |N | ≥ 4, and let v be a game in GN . If there exists a coalition S with
v(S) = v(N \ S), then the game v is separable from the null game by semivalues
modiﬁed for games with coalition structure.
Proof. Let us suppose S′ a coalition with smallest size that veriﬁes v(S′) = v(N \
S′). If |S′| = 1, the game v is separable from the null game by semivalues and also
by modiﬁed semivalues. We can consider that |S′| = s′ ≥ 2 and s′ ≤ n/2. Then,
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the MLE of the game v can be written as
fv =
∑
S:2≤|S|≤s′
⎡
⎣∏
i∈S
xi
∏
j∈N\S
(1 − xj)v(S) +
∏
i∈N\S
xi
∏
j∈S
(1− xj)v(N \ S)
⎤
⎦
+
∑
S:s′<|S|<n−s′
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
j∈N\S
(1 − xj)v(S).
Now, we choose the coalition structure BS′ = {S′, N \ S′}. In such a case, the
modiﬁed MLE g1 for players in coalition block S′ has by expression
g1 =
∑
S⊂S′, s≥2
⎡
⎣(1− y2)∏
i∈S
xi
∏
j∈S′\S
(1− xj) + y2
∏
i∈S′\S
xi
∏
j∈S
(1− xj)
⎤
⎦ v(S)
+ (1− y2)
∏
i∈S′
xi v(S′) + y2
∏
j∈S′
(1− xj) v(N \S′),
because the terms for coalitions S containing elements as well in S′ as in N \S′
vanish in the MLE g1. If k is a player in S′,
∂g1
∂xk
=
∑
S⊂S′, s≥2, S	k
⎡
⎣(1− y2) ∏
i∈S\{k}
xi
∏
j∈S′\S
(1− xj)
−y2
∏
i∈S′\S
xi
∏
j∈S\{k}
(1− xj)
⎤
⎦ v(S)
+
∑
S⊂S′, s≥2, S 
	k
⎡
⎣−(1− y2)∏
i∈S
xi
∏
j∈S′\(S∪{k})
(1− xj)
+y2
∏
i∈S′\(S∪{k})
xi
∏
j∈S
(1 − xj)
⎤
⎦ v(S)
+ (1− y2)
∏
i∈S′\{k}
xi v(S′)− y2
∏
j∈S′\{k}
(1− xj) v(N \ S′).
Then
∂g1
∂xk
(1/2, 1/2) =
1
2s′
[
v(S′)− v(N \S′)]
and the modiﬁed Banzhaf value β separates the game v from the null game:
βk[v;BS′ ] =
∂g1
∂xk
(1/2, 1/2) = 0 for k ∈ S′. 
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Proposition 4.2. Let GN be a vector space of cooperative TU games with six or
more players, |N | ≥ 6, and let v be a game in GN that satisﬁes v(S) = v(N \ S)
∀S ⊆ N and v({i}) = 0 ∀i ∈ N . If there exists a coalition S such that
v(S) =
∑
T⊂S, |T |=2
v(T ) and 3 ≤ |S| ≤ n/2, (4.1)
then the game v is separable from the null game by semivalues modiﬁed for games
with coalition structure.
Proof. The MLE of a game v that satisﬁes the two ﬁrst conditions of the statement
can be written as
fv =
∑
S: 2≤|S|<n/2
⎡
⎣∏
i∈S
xi
∏
j∈N\S
(1− xj) +
∏
i∈N\S
xi
∏
j∈S
(1− xj)
⎤
⎦ v(S)
+
∑
S: |S|=n/2
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
j∈N\S
(1 − xj) v(S), (4.2)
where the second sum only appears in case n even number. Let us suppose S′ a
coalition with smallest size that veriﬁes (4.1) for |S′| < n/2. In such a case, we
choose the coalition structure BS′ = {S′, N \ S′} and we write the modiﬁed MLE
g1 for the players in the coalition block S′:
g1 =
∑
S⊂S′, 2≤s<s′
⎡
⎣(1− y2)∏
i∈S
xi
∏
j∈S′\S
(1 − xj) + y2
∏
i∈S′\S
xi
∏
j∈S
(1− xj)
⎤
⎦ v(S)
+
⎡
⎣(1− y2) ∏
i∈S′
xi + y2
∏
j∈S′
(1− xj)
⎤
⎦ v(S′).
Next, we consider a certain player j1 in the block S′, we compute the partial de-
rivative of the MLE g1 with respect to the variable xj1 and we replace all variables
by the generic value α by grouping the sums as follows:
∂g1
∂xj1
(α, α) =
∑
S⊂S′, S	j1, |S|=2
[
α(1 − α)s′−1 − αs′−1(1 − α)] v(S)
+
∑
S⊂S′, S	j1, 2<s<s′
[
αs−1(1 − α)s′−s+1 − αs′−s+1(1− α)s−1] v(S)
+
∑
S⊂S′, S 
	j1, 2≤s<s′−1
[
αs
′−s(1− α)s − αs(1− α)s′−s] v(S)
+
[
α (1 − α)s′−1 − αs′−1(1− α)] [v(S′\{j1})− v(S′)].
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All terms for coalitions S with S  j1 and 2 ≤ s < s′− 1 can be written by means
of coalitions T with T  j1 and 3 ≤ t < s′. Then,
∂g1
∂xj1
(α, α) = α (1− α)[(1 − α)s′−2 − αs′−2]
×
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
S⊂S′, S	j1, |S|=2
v(S) + v(S′\{j1})− v(S′)
⎫⎬
⎭
+
∑
S⊂S′, S	j1, 2<s<s′
[
αs−1(1− α)s′−s+1 − αs′−s+1(1 − α)s−1] v(S)
+
∑
T⊂S′, T	j1, 2<t<s′
[
αs
′−t+1(1− α)t−1 − αt−1(1− α)s′−t+1] v(T \{j1}).
We shorten the polynomial (1 − α)s′−2 − αs′−2 by means of ps′(α) and we write
v(S′\{j1}) as a sum of utilities of contained bipersonal coalitions:
∂g1
∂xj1
(α, α) = α (1−α)ps′(α)
⎡
⎣ ∑
S⊂S′, S	j1, |S|=2
v(S) +
∑
T⊆S′\{j1}, |T |=2
v(T )− v(S′)
⎤
⎦
+
∑
S⊂S′, S	j1, 2<s<s′
[
αs−1(1− α)s′−s+1 − αs′−s+1(1− α)s−1] [v(S)− v(S\{j1})].
(4.3)
It is possible to ﬁnd coalitions S with S ⊂ S′, S  j1 and 2 < s < s′ only in case
s′ ≥ 4. Then, the last sum in the above expression can be written as
∑
S⊂S′, S	j1, 3≤s<1+s′/2
[
αs−1(1− α)s′−s+1 − αs′−s+1(1 − α)s−1
] [
v(S)− v(S\{j1})
]
+
∑
T⊂S′, T	j1, 1+s′/2<t≤s′−1
[
αt−1(1− α)s′−t+1 − αs′−t+1(1 − α)t−1] [v(T )− v(T \{j1})],
where case s = 1 + s′/2 is not considered, since the size of S only can take value
s = 1 + s′/2 in case s′ even number but, in this case, the coeﬃcient αs−1(1 −
α)s
′−s+1−αs′−s+1(1−α)s−1 is null. In the above sums, we can identify coalitions
S for 3 ≤ s < 1 + s′/2 with coalitions T for 1 + s′/2 < t ≤ s′ − 1 by means of
t = s′ − s+ 2. Then, both sums reduce to
∑
3≤s<1+s′/2
[
αs−1(1− α)s′−s+1 − αs′−s+1(1− α)s−1]
×
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
S⊂S′, S	j1, |S|=s
[
v(S)− v(S \ {j1})
]− ∑
T⊂S′, T	j1, |T |=s′−s+2
[
v(T )− v(T \{j1})
]⎫⎬⎭.
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Let us suppose S′ = {j1, j2, . . . , js′}. For a given cardinality s with 3 ≤ s < 1+s′/2,
the last diﬀerence of sums vanish, because it can be written as
∑
S⊂S′, S	j1, |S|=s
⎡
⎣ ∑
P⊂S, |P |=2
v(P )−
∑
Q⊆S\{j1}, |Q|=2
v(Q)
⎤
⎦
−
∑
T⊂S′, T	j1, |T |=s′−s+2
⎡
⎣ ∑
P⊂T, |P |=2
v(P )−
∑
Q⊂T\{j1}, |Q|=2
v(Q)
⎤
⎦ =
∑
S⊂S′, S	j1, |S|=s
⎡
⎣ ∑
P⊂S, P	j1, |P |=2
v(P )
⎤
⎦ − ∑
T⊂S′, T	j1, |T |=s′−s+2
⎡
⎣ ∑
P⊂T, P	j1, |P |=2
v(P )
⎤
⎦
=
s′∑
i=2
[(
s′ − 2
s− 2
)
−
(
s′ − 2
s′ − s
)]
v({j1, ji}) = 0.
Thus, from expression (4.3), we can write the modiﬁed binomial semivalue ψα for
a certain player j1 ∈ S′ as
(ψα)j1 [v;BS′ ] =
∂g1
∂xj1
(α, α) = α (1 − α)ps′(α)
⎡
⎣ ∑
T⊂S′,|T |=2
v(T )− v(S′)
⎤
⎦ .
Since α = 1/2 is the unique real zero of the polynomial ps′ for values s′ ≥ 3 and
the game v satisﬁes the inequality (4.1) for the coalition S′, we conclude that
(ψα)j1 [v;BS′ ] = 0 for values α ∈ (0, 1/2) ∪ (1/2, 1) and these modiﬁed semivalues
separate the game v from the null game.
Finally, we have to see the case |S| = n/2, when n/2 is the smallest size of the
coalitions that verify condition (4.1) in the statement. Here, n is an even number
and all coalitions in the second sum of expression (4.2), for |S| = n/2, can be
grouped by pairs: S and N \ S with v(N \ S) = v(S). Now, the selected coalition
for the procedure S′ will belong to one or another half of the coalitions with size
n/2; we choose half that contains coalition S′ and describe the second sum with
S as the same way that the ﬁrst sum in expression (4.2). Then, by repeating the
same procedure as in case |S| < n/2, we reach the same conclusion. 
5. Expanded shuffle games
In this section we deﬁne a particular type of games related to the shuﬄe
games that verify both necessary conditions of inseparability introduced in Propo-
sitions 4.1 and 4.2. We denote by DN the vector subspace of all cooperative
games in GN inseparable from the null game by semivalues modiﬁed for games
with coalition structure.
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Definition 5.1. In GN with |N | ≥ 5 we consider a shuﬄe game with coalition
size 2, vi,j,k,l , k, l ∈ N \ {i, j}. The expanded shuﬄe game vei,j,k,l related to the
shuﬄe game vi,j,k,l is the sum of all shuﬄe games in GN , vP,i,j,k,l , with the same
shuﬄed players, i.e.,
vei,j,k,l =
∑
P	i,j, P⊆N\{k,l}
vP,i,j,k,l.
Lemma 5.2. In GN with |N | ≥ 5 an expanded shuﬄe game vei,j,k,l , k, l ∈ N \
{i, j}, satisﬁes the following properties:
(a) vei,j,k,l(S) = v
e
i,j,k,l(N \ S) ∀S ⊆ N ;
(b) vei,j,k,l(S) =
∑
T⊂S, |T |=2 v
e
i,j,k,l(T ) ∀S ⊆ N and 3 ≤ |S| ≤ |N |;
(c) its MLE is fve
i,j,k,l
= xixj + xkxl − xjxk − xixl.
Proof. It is easy to prove sections (a) and (b); it suﬃces to check if the players
i, j, k, l belong or not to each coalition S, since the unique bipersonal coalitions
that take non-null values in game vei,j,k,l are {i, j}, {k, l}, {j, k} and {i, l}. In order
to verify section (c) we can write the MLE of the game vei,j,k,l as
fvei,j,k,l =
[
xixj + xkxl − xjxk − xixl
] ⎡⎣ ∏
q∈N\{i,j,k,l}
(1− xq) + f∑
Q⊆N\{i,j,k,l} 1Q
⎤
⎦,
where the games 1Q are considered in GN\{i,j,k,l}. Since
∑
Q⊆N\{i,j,k,l} 1Q(T ) = 1
∀T ⊆ N \ {i, j, k, l}, T = ∅, (Q = ∅), its MLE equals the unity in N \ {i, j, k, l}
and section (c) follows. 
Proposition 5.3. In spaces of cooperative TU games GN with |N | ≥ 5 every
expanded shuﬄe game vei,j,k,l , k, l ∈ N \ {i, j}, belongs to the vector subspace DN .
Proof. Section (c) in the above lemma proves that the MLE of an expanded shuﬄe
game vei,j,k,l , k, l ∈ N\{i, j}, in GN with |N | ≥ 5 agrees with the MLE of the shuﬄe
game vi,j,k,l in a space of cooperative games with only four players, {i, j, k, l}.
In order to demonstrate that the game vei,j,k,l , k, l ∈ N \ {i, j}, is inseparable
by modiﬁed semivalues, we can consider that the players i, j, k, l are distributed
in diﬀerent coalition blocks in the same way that in the proof of Proposition 3.4.
The remaining players N \{i, j, k, l} will be distributed in the diﬀerent blocks next
to the players i, j, k, l or they will form new coalition blocks.
Since the variables that correspond to the players in N \ {i, j, k, l} does not
appear in the MLE of the game vei,j,k,l , when we compute allocations for the players
i, j, k, l by means of a product of matrices as in (2.5), we obtain the same result
as in Proposition 3.4, that is, ψp[vei,j,k,l, B] = 0 for p = i, j, k, l, ∀ψ ∈ Sem(GN ),
∀B coalition structure in N.
For the remaining players, ψq[vei,j,k,l, B] = 0 ∀q ∈ N \ {i, j, k, l}, since the
variable xq does not appear in the MLE. 
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Table 1. Dimensions of the shared kernels (2 ≤ |N | ≤ 8).
Cardinality of N 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
dimGN 3 7 15 31 63 127 255
dimCN 0 0 2 10 32 84 198
dimDN 0 0 2 5 9 14 20
Theorem 5.4. Let GN be a vector space of cooperative TU games with ﬁve or
more players, |N | = n ≥ 5. Then,
(a) dimDN =
(
n
2
)− n;
(b) the vector subspace DN is spanned by expanded shuﬄe games.
Proof. We can see in [1] that the shared kernel CN for |N | ≥ 4 is spanned by
2n − n2 + n− 2 shuﬄe games whose coalitions with non-null value vary from size
s = 2 to size s = n − 2. We choose the (n2) − n shuﬄe games with coalition
size 2. Since they are linearly independent in GN , its expanded games are also
linearly independent and, by above Proposition, inseparable from the null game
by modiﬁed semivalues. The linear subspace spanned by these expanded shuﬄe
games is contained in the subspace DN for |N | ≥ 5.
In addition, because DN ⊆ CN , the freedom degrees in CN by a consequence
of conditions (2.7) for coalitions with sizes s > n/2 disappear according to the
necessary condition of inseparability from the null game in DN : v(S) = v(N \ S)
(Prop. 4.1). Also, the freedom degrees for coalitions with size from s = 3 to
s = n/2 disappear according to the necessary condition v(S) =
∑
T⊂S, |T |=2 v(T )
∀S ⊆ N with 3 ≤ |S| ≤ n/2 (Prop. 4.2).
Only the
(
n
2
) − n freedom degrees for coalition size s = 2 in CN remain in the
vector subspace DN . Then, the vector subspace spanned by the
(
n
2
)−n expanded
shuﬄe games agrees with DN . 
Concluding remark
It is known that every cooperative game with two or three players is separable from
the null game by semivalues, i.e., dimCN = 0 in cases |N | = 2, 3. Consequently,
the vector subspace DN only contains the null game if |N | = 2, 3. For games
with four players, Proposition 3.4 proves that both separability concepts coincide:
DN = CN for |N | = 4.
For games with ﬁve or more players, the introduction of semivalues modiﬁed
for games with coalition structure allows us to reduce in a signiﬁcant way the
dimension of the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game.
The diﬀerence of dimensions between the vector subspaces CN and DN shows us
how much wider the family of modiﬁed semivalues is than the family of semivalues,
according to the ability to separate games from the null game. By linearity, the
separability between two games is reduced by both solution concepts to separability
of their diﬀerence from the null game. The ability of separation by semivalues has
remarkably increased by the introduction of a priori coalition structures.
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